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THE CHARTER

OF THE UNITED NATIONS

AND THE

PACKAGE DEAL

by

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PERMANENT RERESENTATIVE OF CHINA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

CHINESE DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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On 1 December 1955, the Special Political Committee (Ad Hoc Political Committee) of the General Assembly began the debate on the package deal relating to the admission of new members introduced by Canada and twenty-seven other countries. The package covered eighteen countries, including five Soviet Russian satellites, namely, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Outer Mongolia and Romania. Dr. Tsiang addressed the Committee on 2 December as follows:

My delegation wishes first of all to express its most sincere appreciation for the work of the Committee of Good Offices which the General Assembly established at its eighth session and renewed last year at its ninth session. I wish to put on record my thanks to the Chairman of the Committee, the representative of Peru, and to his two colleagues, the representatives of Egypt and the Netherlands, for their persistent endeavours in carrying out the task entrusted to them by the General Assembly.

It may be recalled that when we found the question of new members had reached a deadlock we realized that the deadlock was in the Security Council, particularly among the five permanent members of the Security Council. The task of the Committee of Good Offices was to consult with the members of the Security Council with the object of exploring the possibilities of reaching an agreed solution of the problem of the admission of new members in accordance

with Article IV of the Charter.

The relations of the Committee of Good Offices with my delegation, throughout its two years of existence, have been cordial and sincere. We have had periodic consultations, and I personally had hoped that the Committee might succeed in finding an agreed solution. It seems to me only proper that the General Assembly should acknowledge its debt to the three members of the Committee of Good Offices.

The present proposal, embodied in the 28-Power joint draft resolution, has not come by way of preliminary conciliation or consultation. So far as my delegation is concerned, we knew nothing of the contents of the proposal until it was presented to the Assembly. My delegation therefore approaches the present draft resolution without any commitment of any kind to anybody. We join with other members of the Committee to study the problem of the admission of new members all over again. It is now my duty to put before this Committee the general considerations which guide the action of my delegation in this matter.

Throughout these years, whenever we have discussed the problem of the admission of new members, a number of delegations have advocated the principle of universality. The first time that I stated my attitude towards this principle was at the 206th meeting of the Security Council held on 1 October 1947. At that time the representative of Syria, Mr. El-Khoury, in the course of a debate on the admission of new members, advocated the principle of universality. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall quote a single para-

graph from my statement on that occasion:

"I favour the principle of universality so ably advocated here by the representative of Syria, but we can try only to approach universality. A mechanical and mathematical universality is not possible and was never intended by the authors of the Charter, as is evidenced by the fact that the Charter lays down conditions for admission to as well as conditions for expulsion from the United Nations. However, it is my belief that in applying the relevant Articles, we should be liberal and objective. Where there is legitimate ground for doubt, the benefit of doubt should be given to the applicant."

(Security Council Official Records, 206th meeting)

That statement which I made in the fall of 1947 stands today. My delegation is ready to co-operate with other delegations in approaching universality of membership. In applying the Charter tests to applicants for membership,

my delegation would wish to be both liberal and objective.

A few delegations have tried to exploit the principle of universality to justify package deals. I am glad to note that there are a goodly number of delegations which, while believing in the principle of universality, reject the package deal. The representative of Greece, speaking before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee in the fall of 1949, had this to say:

"Although his delegation considered that the United Nations should become universal, it nevertheless believed that each applicant for membership should be considered separately and on its merits."

On that same occasion the representative of Norway stated to this Committee:

"The Norwegian delegation had said at the preceding session of the General Assembly, and wishes to repeat, that the United Nations should be as universal as possible; but it felt that the provisions of the Charter should be strictly applied, and that each case should be examined separately."

The United Kingdom delegation, with Sir Alexander Cadogan as its spokesman, put the matter very simply and, I will say, conclusively:

"Such a proposal" — that is, a package deal — "could only be characterized as blackmail. The United Kingdom could not accept the procedure of bloc voting which it would entail. It continued to adhere to the view that each application for membership should be judged separately on its merits, by reference to the conditions laid down in Article 4. The principle of universality of the United Nations could not be distorted to mean the automatic admission of States to membership in the Organization."

It is clear to my delegation that the thesis of automatic universality in membership in the United Nations is contrary to the Charter and that this principle cannot be used to justify package deals. I do not think it necessary to take up

the time of the Committee in further argumentation on this point.

The history of package deals on the admission of new members may be divided into two periods. The first period was one of confusion. During that period, a small number of delegations wavered between support and opposition. Then, on 28 May 1948, came the historic advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. In view of the importance of that opinion, I shall quote a few words of the pertinent section of that opinion:

"A Member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, is not juridically en-

titled to make its consent to the admission depending on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article."

The International Court of Justice went on to say:

"In particular, a Member of the Organization cannot, while it recognizes the conditions set forth in that provision to be fulfilled by the State concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the additional condition that other States be admitted to membership in the United Nations together with that State."

I call the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice an epochmaking decision. With that opinion, the United Nations entered upon its second period in the discussion of the package deal. Whereas in the first period there was confusion and sometimes even contradiction, after the Court had rendered its decision there has been neither confusion nor contradiction. Since that time, all delegations, with the exception of the Soviet bloc, have held any package deal to be unconstitutional. Since that time, the package deal has been the exclusive property of the Soviet bloc.

Canada, I am glad to observe, has taken a prominent part in the consideration of this question, as it has in the consideration of many other questions in the United Nations. We have on record a number of statements made by Canadian representatives on the package deal. In 1948, the Official Record of the Ad Hoc Political Committee carried this statement by the Canadian

spokesman:

"Certain States have in the past attempted to resort to what has been called 'horse trading' in the matter of membership. The Canadian delegation viewed with utmost concern that type of dealing in this all-important matter of membership applications. It was deplorable, and should not be associated with the name of any Member in good standing of the United Nations." (Official Records, third session, Part I, p. 74)

In 1949, also before the Ad Hoc Political Committee, General McNaughton, of Canada, speaking about a Soviet proposal for the simultaneous admission of thirteen States, reminded us all that:

"Such methods were incompatible with the nature of the United Nations, which was a moral authority."

This stand against the package deal has been shared by the overwhelming majority of delegations from all parts of the world.

In 1948 the representative of Iraq told this same Committee the following:

"The General Assembly and the Security Council ought to take into account the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, according to which the fate of one State must not be linked to that of other States or other conditions demanded than those provided by the Charter."

(Official Records, third session, Part I, page 106)

The representative of France likewise stated his position to this Committee in unmistakable terms:

"The linking of the admission of one State with that of another constituted an abuse of power and should be condemned, since it was foreign to the spirit of the Charter."

(Official Records, third session, Part I, page 118)

Those words were stated in 1948.

Let me come to more recent years. In 1952 the delegation of Poland put before this Committee a proposal for another package deal. On that occasion the representative of Peru, none other than our respected friend and colleague, Mr. Belaunde, took this stand — and I quote from the official records:

"The Peruvian representative considered that the adoption of the Polish draft resolution was accepting an illegal bargain concerning the admission of new members."

On that same occasion Sir Gladwyn Jebb of the United Kingdom delegation told this Committee — and I quote from the official records:

"... that the United Kingdom's attitude towards the Polish draft resolution remains exactly as it had been towards all package proposals for the admission of several new members. The United Kingdom considers that any proposal which made the admission of one country or a number of countries conditional upon the admission of another country was contrary to the provisions of the Charter and to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice."

In 1953 Mr. Byrnes, speaking for the United States, told this Committee — and I quote from the official records:

"... that the package proposal would mean the United Nations would have to abandon the principles and provisions of Article 4."

In that same year, that is, in 1953, Sir Gladwyn Jebb told this Committee that — and I quote from the official records:

"... his delegation was not prepared to support any suggestion that the United Kingdom representative on the Security Council should vote in favour of some or all of the candidates supported by the Soviet Union in return for a Soviet Union vote in favour of some or all other candidates."

In that same year, 1953, before this Committee, the representative of Brazil added the weight of his delegation against package deals. He said:

"... qualifications could not be examined if States were admitted en bloc. The fact that careful scrutiny was essential had been understood from the outset, as was shown in the report of Committee I/2 to Commission I at San Francisco. At that time and afterwards the USSR had completely agreed as Mr. Gromyko had made clear in his statement at the 55th meeting of the Security Council on 28 August 1946. The Brazilian delegation still stood by the position then taken by the USSR, that every application should be the subject of careful study."

I could continue to quote from the records of the United Nations. I have limited myself to a small number of quotations from the records of this Committee. I consider these quotations to be sufficient to show that since the International Court of Justice rendered its advisory opinion in 1948, the delegations to the United Nations, whether in the Assembly or in the Security Council, have been unanimous in condemning the package deal, with of course the exception of the delegations from the Soviet bloc. Now even if some of the other delegations should change their stand on this matter, which I hope will not prove to be the case, my delegation finds it only right and necessary to remain stead-

fast in its opposition to any package deal in any form.

The advocates of the package deal today frankly admit that the package deal is a violation of the principles of the Charter, as well as being contrary to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. Some of them frankly say that of the applicants included in the present package, there are several whom they dislike. The present-day advocates of the package deal fall back on one justification and one alone; that is, expediency. I have grave doubts about the political wisdom or expediency of the present package.

I shall now proceed to examine the contents of the present package.

In the first place, I note that the present package, by its formula as set forth in the joint draft resolution placed before this Committee, excludes the Republic of Korea. My delegation is firmly convinced that the exclusion of the Republic of Korea is unjustified. Let me remind this Committee of the terms of a resolution (195 [IIII]) passed by the General Assembly on 12 December 1948:

"The General Assembly,

"Declares that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea."

That is what the General Assembly thought about the Republic of Korea according to this resolution. This Government, 'the only such Government in Korea", as stated in our resolution, applied for membership in the United Nations in 1949. I would like to say that in my judgment no government established in the postwar period has a better claim to membership in the United Nations than the Government of the Republic of Korea. I deplore deeply that this Government is excluded by the proposal before this Committee.

I also note that the present package deal excludes Vietnam. My delegation

likewise regrets such exclusion.

Now let us look at the applicants included in the package. I assume that the sponsors of the joint draft resolution would include and intend their proposal to include Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. Hitherto four out of the five permanent members of the Security Council have opposed the admission of these four satellite States on grounds of not being peace-loving, of not being truly independent sovereign States, and of not having fulfilled treaty obligations to observe human rights. Most of the non-permanent members of the Security Council have done likewise. The factual situation in these four countries, so far as I know, has not changed. The grounds for opposing the admission of these four applicants are as valid today as in any previous year.

I had an occasion to speak at length on the application of these four satellite States at the 595th meeting of the Security Council held on 3 September 1952. I do not wish to take up the time of this Committee to repeat what I said on that occasion. I wish only to say that every word I said on that occasion remains true today. In summarizing the situation in these Eastern European States, I quoted from an article written by a distinguished journalist and a valiant fighter for human freedom. I mean Mr. Leland Stowe. In a despatch pub-

lished in a large number of papers in the United States on 28 July 1952 — I took this quotation from the Washington Post of that day — he had this to say about Eastern Europe:

"What have the Soviets accomplished in Eastern Europe?

"They have made the Eastern European countries prisoners of the Kremlin. Their resources are directed solely to the building-up

of Soviet power.

"They have controlled the life of every individual — from infants to great grand-parents, from workers to women, from bankers to beggars, from peasants to poets, from teachers to preachers, from contraltos to coffin makers.

"They have suppressed the independence of churches of every creed. They are subverting religious organizations to the political objectives

of the Kremlin.

"They have placed more than one million Eastern Europeans in prisons and slave-labour camps. They are expanding these accommodations toward a goal of several million more slaves.

"They have destroyed all political opposition. They are embarked upon liquidation of the upper and middle classes, through slow starva-

tion, mass deportations and death sentence 'justice'.

"They have perverted education. They are russianizing the cultures, history, literature, science, arts and traditions of the East European countries.

"They are well-advanced toward communizing the younger generation, nearly 20 million young people below the age of twenty-one.

"In reality Soviet Russia extends today to Berlin and Vienna." —

This was written in 1952.—
"The red Bussians hold and rule more of Furone t

"The red Russians hold and rule more of Europe than the imperial Turks at the peak of their power."

(S/PV. 595, paragraph 65)

Since the summer of 1952, when this summary was made by Mr. Leland Stowe, the situation in these captive countries has not changed in the least, with the exception, of course, of Vienna which fortunately has at last been liberated.

The peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania have not accepted the enslavement of their countries so far as I know. They are struggling for their freedom. The United Nations, for reasons of prudence, has closed its eyes and shut its ears to the cries for freedom from the millions in Eastern Europe. Should the United Nations for the sake of expediency help international Communism in making the chains of enslavement stronger and heavier? This is a question that all delegations must answer before casting their votes on this draft resolution.

Some delegations assure us that their support of the applications of these States for membership does not imply their approval of the Governments of these countries. They, some of them, even expressly state that they do not approve these Governments. But they go on to say that, for the sake of getting membership for other deserving States, they are willing to stomach these captive nations. The trouble with this approach to the problem is that the Communist regimes in these countries have absolute control of all media of public information. What reservations delegations make here will not be made known to the peoples within the iron curtain. Admission of these States will be exploited in Communist propaganda. Admission will be made to mean that the free world, nay, the whole world, accepts and approves the established Govern-

ments in these countries. Communist propagandists will elaborate on this theme and go on to draw the conclusion for the peoples that any opposition to

the established order is vain and useless.

For these reasons, my delegation is not prepared to share in the responsibility for admitting these States to the United Nations and thereby casting the halo of approval on them. I wish that the United Nations may have some message of encouragement or some form of aid to send to the peoples in these captive countries. I regret that the United Nations is not in a position to make such a positive contribution to freedom.

I have, however, hoped that at least the United Nations would not add to the darkness and gloom in which these peoples live. In admitting these four satellite States to the United Nations, I have no doubt that the United Nations will have dealt a heavy blow to the aspirations of millions of people in eastern

Europe.

The Soviet draft amendment to the joint draft resolution specifies the inclusion of Outer Mongolia in the present package. Outer Mongolia is in many respects similar to the four captive nations that I have just discussed. The people of Outer Mongolia have no freedom. They too are hoping and struggling for their freedom. Outer Mongolia as an independent sovereign country exists only in Soviet propaganda. But there are also some differences between Outer Mongolia on the one hand and the four European satellite States on the other. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania had had a history of independent existence before these countries were taken over by the Soviet Union; they were historical entities. The independence of Outer Mongolia was created by the Soviet Union as a camouflage for Soviet colonization. There was no independence in Outer Mongolia before Soviet subversion and aggression began; it was part of my country. Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia was publicly and officially acknowledged by the Soviet Union. Since it became, according to Soviet terminology, "independent", Outer Mongolia has not, in fact, a shred of independence. The claim of independence has neither historical foundation nor present-day actuality. Outer Mongolia is a Soviet colony, exploited for Soviet purposes.

In 1947 the Soviet Union instigated the so-called Outer Mongolian Government to invade my country. At the time when the aggression took place, I called the attention of the Security Council to the seriousness of the situation. At the 186th meeting of the Security Council held on 18 August 1947 I reported to the Security Council that Mongolian troops had invaded the territory of my country up to a place called Peitaishan, which is well over 100 kilometers inside the boundary line. That aggression could not be simply explained as an expression of the nomadic instinct, since it was accompanied by a certain num-

ber of aeroplanes.

In the course of the war in Korea, troops from Outer Mongolia fought side by side with Korean and Chinese Communists against the United Nations. The aggressors took pains to conceal the identity of Outer Mongolian troops and to black out all news about their participation. Nevertheless, the world press managed to furnish some information. For example, a United Press despatch carrying dateline Seoul, 27 November 1950, told the world:

"The 89th Division of the Soviet Army was moving towards the northeastern border of Korea; with them, there are two divisions of Mongolian troops."

The Sin Tao Daily News of Hongkong, on 23 August 1952, published the following item:

"It has been reported that the Mongolian cavalry appeared on the front in Korea. It is ascertained now that Outer Mongolia has formally mobilized its troops to march into North Korea to participate as part of the Chinese Volunteer Army. The total number mobilized is estimated to be 80,000. The first batch has arrived at the battlefield in Korea, consisting of 20,000 cavalry, the rest being airforce and artillery force."

The Committee will remember that a large number of Chinese Communist prisoners of war chose to be sent to Taiwan. Among the 14,000 prisoners of war so repatriated, more than 5,000 fought side by side with or saw Mongolian troops in action against the United Nations. According to their testimony, several facts have been established. First, the anti-aircraft guns on both banks of the Yalu River were manned by Mongolian gunners. All the United Nations aircraft shot down along the Yalu were victims of Outer Mongolian troops. Second, Outer Mongolian cavalry units were stationed at Sinhing, Heisuitung and Pyonyang. They were often assigned to clear up operations on the hills. Third, at Mount Sinkao, Outer Mongolian armoured units were stationed, and at Tusan was an armoured unit converted from cavalry. Fourth, many Outer Mongolians were the same uniforms as North Koreans but had distinct insignia on their caps. Fifth, at least two Outer Mongolian cavalry regiments were engaged in action in Korea.

My Government would welcome a commission of investigation from the United Nations to interview these prisoners of war who are now in Taiwan, or, if the United Nations so desires, my Government would be prepared to send here any number of witnesses to appear before this Committee or some other

committee for questioning.

Among thoese witnesses would be Galungashu, an Outer Mongolian, born and brought up in Tasuiyuan, in Central Outer Mongolia. He served among the Outer Mongolian air pilots as interpreter of Mongolian and Russian languages and was decorated by the Soviet Government for so-called heroic services in Korea. Parenthetically, I may add that the decoration award to Galungashu by the Soviet Government is today in the custody of the United Nations Command. This man, if brought here, can tell the United Nations the extent of Outer Mongolian participation in the aggression in Korea.

The members of the Committee should furthermore keep in mind that Mongolians as a people are just as divided as the Korean and the Vietnamese people are today unfortunately divided. Of the three million Mongols, a little less than one million live in northern, that is, Outer Mongolia, while two million

live in southern, that is, Inner Mongolia.

The situation in Outer Mongolia can be summarized in a few words. Outer Mongolia was a part of China. It was seized by the Soviet Union, given a cloak of independence by the Soviet Union, and then exploited by the Soviet Union for further aggression against China and Korea. Is such a region, certainly

not a country, entitled to membership in the United Nations?

I have explained the attitude of my delegation towards the principle of universality. I have set forth the legal, political and moral considerations against any package deal and I have done it mostly in words used by representatives whose voices should carry weight with us. I have completed the examination of the contents of the present package put before us, both as regards what it contains and as regards what it leaves out. In conclusion, I should like to ask: What has driven the United Nations to its present plight in this matter of the admission of new Members? Why have delegations made such a turnabout on this question? The answer is plain: the Soviet abuse of the veto power in the

Security Council. According to my calculations the Soviet delegation has cast twenty-five vetoes against applicant States. This is blackmail. The United Nations, after all these years of struggle, is asked by the joint draft resolution to pay the blackmail demanded by the Soviet Union. I call this step uncondi-

tional surrender of the United Nations to the Soviet Union.

The plea of expediency is based on the fact that the present proposal would make possible the admission of thirteen free States. When the Security Council on many occasions considered the thirteen qualified and deserving States including such great countries as Japan, Ceylon, Jordan, Portugal, Italy and Austria, to name only a few, China has on every occasion voted for their admission to the United Nations. In the case of Spain, my Foreign Minister declared before the plenary meeting of this Assembly as early as 28 September that the Chinese delegation will support Spain's admission. In fact, my delegation has done everything possible to bring about their admission. I should like to say that my delegation will continue to do what is possible to bring about their admission. But if we were to admit them simultaneously with the other five, who in our judgement are not entitled to membership of the United Nations, we would be weakening the foundations of the United Nations although, I admit, we would be enlarging its super-structure. It would be a tragedy if we destroyed the United Nations in an effort to expand its super-structure.

After several days of debate, in which some forty delegates took part, Dr. Tsiang on 7 December summarized the situation as follows:

I have listened with very close attention to the speeches made in the course of this debate. I have read over again many of the speeches in the verbatim record, including the speech of the distinguished representative of Syria, in order that I may understand completely the meaning of the speeches, in order that I may not miss any of their implications.

I would have preferred to make this second intervention after the completion of the general debate in order that I could take into consideration the sentiments of every delegation represented in this Committee. In view of the parliamentary situation and, since it is now my turn to speak, I will make my second

submission at this time.

First of all, I would like to pay a tribute to my friend and distinguished colleague from Cuba, Ambassador Nuñez-Portuondo, for his great speech before this Committee on Monday morning. I admire his courage and his realism. Ambassador Nuñez-Portuondo has, indeed, done the United Nations a great service in warning us not to contribute, by our vote, and I shall cite his words "... to anything which would amount to giving advantages to those who wish to convert the earth into a vast, a very vast, concentration camp."

(A/AC. 80/PV.27, p. 65).

It is obvious that many representatives wish to see admitted to the United Nations a large number of applicant States. Some emphasize the claims of Spain, Italy and Portugal as being closest to their hearts; others have emphasized the claims of Libya and Jordan; still others have emphasized the claims of Japan and Ceylon. In that eagerness to see these great, free States admitted to the United Nations, my delegation does not lag behind any of the other delegations represented here. I would like to emphasize that point: I say that I am as eager to see these countries admitted as any other delegation represented in this Committee. I emphasize that point because, in the course of this debate, a number of special appeals have been directed to my delegation.

I think that if the record of the Security Council and of the General Assembly were to be examined carefully, we must acknowledge that, so far as my delegation is concerned, no special appeals are necessary. Let us examine the rec-

ord; let us take, first of all, Italy.

The application of Italy was voted upon in the Security Council four times: once, in August 1947; once, in October 1947; once, in September 1949; and once, in February 1952. On all four occasions, my delegation voted for the admission of Italy and, on all four occasions, the Soviet Union cast a veto on the application of Italy. The lamentable fact that Italy has not been admitted to the United Nations much earlier, cannot be attributed to the responsibility of my delegation. If an appeal should be made on behalf of Italy, that appeal certainly should not be directed to my delegation.

Naturally, China and Italy, being so far apart geographically, are very different in their cultural origins. We are not so close to Italy as are some other countries represented here. Nevertheless, China and Italy have experienced centuries of friendly relationship. Our relations, in fact, go much further back than the relations between Italy and some of the countries represented here. Informal relations between China and Italy go as far back as the Han Dynasty

in China and the Roman Empire.

Let us not go that far back; I am sure that you all know of Marco Polo and the contributions he made to the exchange of culture between China and Italy. Let us remind you of Matteo Ricci, another son of Italy, who came to my country during the second half of the sixteenth century and the early part of the seventeenth century. Matteo Ricci — one of the greatest men in the history of Christianity — came to my country and brought to us the Christian message and, at the same time, translated, into Chinese, Euclid's geometry; he built in China the first mapa mundi; he helped us to improve our knowledge of astronomy. In fact, we could say that Matteo Ricci was the first western man to introduce modern science to China. We have not forgotten him.

Let us go on to the eighteenth century: some of you may remember the illustrious name of Giuseppe Castiglione, who tried to fuse the best traditions of Italian painting with the best traditions of Chinese painting; the name of Giuseppe Castiglione remains illustrious in the history of Chinese painting. We

have not forgotten him.

Let me now go on to the nineteenth century.

Chinese nationalism has, naturally, its own cultural background. We have our own historical roots, but of all Western influences in the direction of Chinese nationalism no influence has been so beneficent and potent as the influence of the Italian *Risorgimento*, the influence of such great leaders of Italian nationalism as Cayour, Mazzini and Garibaldi.

I remember some years ago in Peiping, chancing upon a handwritten letter addressed by Count Cavour to a friend of his in China requesting his friend to buy for his country, which was then Piedmont, eggs of Chinese silkworms so that sericulture in Piedmont might be improved. I treasured that letter; I put it away with other treasured papers. In the course of the Second World War.

unfortunately, it was destroyed.

Let me come to still more recent times. In July and August 1945, I had the honour to represent my country in the council meeting of the first United Nations organization, namely the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which was called UNRRA. At that council meeting held in London the question was raised whether Italy should receive benefits from UNRRA. I, as the representative of China, had the honour — and I deemed it a privilege, too — to champion the cause of post-war Italy. My Government instructed me to quote on that occasion an old Chinese proverb, namely "When there is rice, let all share". I thought, even that early — July and August 1945 — that Italy was entitled to benefits from UNRRA.

The British representative in that council, Mr. Philip Noel-Baker, fought that battle on the same side, and the next day, in the parliamentary debate, he quoted from my speech to justify the stand that his Government took on that question.

So far as Italy is concerned, I pledge that my delegation will continue to support the application of Italy. For that purpose, no special appeal to me is neces-

sary.

Now let us turn to another case. Let us examine the record in respect of Japan. The application of Japan was voted upon in the Security Council in 1952. My delegation voted in favour of that application. I spoke strongly, with all the strength I could command, for the admission of Japan. Again that application was vetoed by the Soviet Union. It is unnecessary for anyone to appeal to me for support of the Japanese application. China and Japan are close in race, culture and geography. On this occasion I would like to say something about my Government's special attitude toward Japan in the post-war period. In 1943, in the midst of war, I was in this country on a war-time mission and I was asked, by the Metropolitan Opera House in New York, to broadcast a speech on

terms of peace with Japan. At that time, for a representative of an Allied country to speak on that important subject was not an easy task. My Government instructed me to go ahead with the speech, and to tell the American people exactly how we felt on that question. In the course of my speech I said, among other things, that the Allied nations should not impose any particular type of political system on Japan. Whether the Japanese people should choose to be a monarchy or a republic should be left to them. I went on to say that, situated as it was, post-war Japan could not possibly support its seventy million people without large markets in other countries. And I said that so far as that was concerned, China would contribute its share to making life for the Japanese people possible. Naturally I added that the contribution of China alone would not be enough. Other countries must also co-operate to make it possible for the Japanese people to live well and to live peacefully with all its neighbours.

We in China had, even in the midst of war with Japan, the conviction that the Japanese people were basically peace-loving. Many members of this Committee may have forgotten, but we in China have not forgotten, that in the years before the War many leaders of Japan were against war and for that stand lost their lives at the hands of terrorist assassins. The world should remember that fact, that when the militarists and terrorists were trying to create an atmosphere in which no peace sentiments could be expressed, there were brave men in Japan who stood their ground, even to the extent of sacrificing their lives. No doubt Japan deserves membership in the United Nations. My delegation will continue to support the application of Japan, and for this purpose

we need no special appeals from anyone.

Let us turn, now, to the record of the other countries. The application of Jordan has been voted on three times in the Security Council; three times my delegation voted for its admission and three times the Soviet Union vetoed its application. The application of Portugal has been voted on three times also; all three times my delegation voted for it and the Soviet Union against it. Austria was voted on twice in the Security Council; twice I supported it and twice the Soviet Union vetoed it. Finland was voted on twice in the Security Council; twice my delegation voted for it and twice the Soviet Union vetoed it. Ceylon was voted on three times in the Security Council; my delegation voted three times in favour and the Soviet Union three times against. Nepal was voted on once in the Security Council; my delegation voted in favour and the Soviet Union against. Libya was voted on once; my delegation voted for and the Soviet Union against. Laos was voted on once; my delegation voted for and the Soviet Union against. Laos was voted on once; my delegation voted for and the Soviet Union against.

That is the record. And so far as Spain is concerned, my Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke for the admission of Spain even before the Spanish application

was formally before the United Nations.

In the course of this debate several delegations thought it necessary to address a special appeal to my delegation on this question. The delegations of Iraq, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and Ecuador have done that. The representatives of these countries are sincere friends of mine and of my country. I know that they made this appeal with the best of motives. But I must say that the record shows that their appeals have been directed to the wrong delegation.

In the course of this debate, two delegations have referred to the fact that in 1946 my Government recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia, and that in the Security Council in 1946 my delegation voted for the admission of Outer Mongolia. My Government's recognition and my delegation's vote in 1946 were all part of another "package deal", the "package deal" of Yalta. The parts

of that deal, other than the part regarding Outer Mongolia, have all been destroyed by the Soviet Union. My Government finds that it is only just that we,

too, should nullify the part relating to Outer Mongolia.

One of the most notable contributions to this debate was the speech of the distinguished representative of Australia, Sir Percy Spender. So far as I am concerned, his speech amounted to an invitation for me to go along with him on a great "expedition" — I will call it a "hunting expedition." That was a great speech because Sir Percy Spender, true to the national character of the Australian people, called a spade a spade. It rendered a service to this Committee and to the General Assembly because that speech scraped off much of the plaster which our colleague from Canada so artfully put around this "package deal". That speech by Sir Percy Spender permitted us for the first time to see the "package" as it is, with all the rotten stuff that is in it. This "package deal" has been justified repeatedly on the ground of universality of membership, the "principle of universality". What did Sir Percy say on this principle of universality? I quote from the verbatim record:

"I prefer to put the issue before us in that way because this is what I think the issue really is. I am not prepared to coin fine and high-sounding phrases to disguise this unfortunate fact. Nor shall I invoke any high principle — such as the so-called principle of universality, which if it means anything means that a nation is entitled to be admitted to the United Nations irrespective of whether it does or does not comply with the relevant Article, which is Article 4, of the Charter."

(A/AC.80/PV.28, p. 23-25)

How does this joint draft resolution stand with the Charter? It is the opinion and the conviction of Sir Percy Spender that in passing this joint draft resolution we all — and I quote his words — "officiate at the burial of Article 4 of the Charter."

How does this draft resolution stand in relation to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice? Sir Percy says on that point:

"Let it be said, without any reservation, that what we propose to do — what the Australian delegation both intends to do and urges other countries to do — is contrary to that Advisory Opinion."

(Ibid., p. 28)

However, Sir Percy went on to say that that Opinion was, after all, advisory

and "does not bind the General Assembly or the Security Council."

I think it is a serious business for the General Assembly to go against the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. The United Nations is charged with building a new international order; if that new international order is to mean anything, I for one believe that that order must be based on the rule of law. I cannot subscribe to that statement, that the opinion of the Court could be lightly set aside.

At this rate, at the speed at which the Australian and other delegations wish us to go, we will soon come to the point when people will say that after all the Ten Commandments are only advisory opinions and that as they are advisory

opinions, individuals have discretion about them.

Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that Sir Percy recognized that this joint draft resolution is contrary to the Charter and contrary to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice and that it is a "package" not to his liking, he invited me to go on this "hunting expedition" with him.

If Sir Percy should invite me to do something illegal — and I will even say

immoral — I would hesitate, even though that invitation should come from Sir Percy Spender. But he justifies, and urges me to join with him in, this "hunting expedition" because he assures me that there is great profit in it. He has taken the trouble to draw up a balance sheet with the losses in one column and the gains in the other column and he has managed to set forth, he says, that the final net is a gain. If we study Sir Percy Spender's balance sheet, we will notice that he has omitted the most important single item of loss. It is by omitting that loss that he managed to dress up the balance sheet as he did.

What is the loss that he omitted? This joint draft resolution invites us to admit the five "People's Democracies". That term "people's democracy" is only a name — a dishonest name — for colony, serf colony at that. "People's Democracy" is a device for this new type of imperialism practised by the Soviet Union. Can any of the co-sponsors deny that Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Outer Mongolia are controlled and exploited by the Soviet Union?

I do not think he can.

I notice in the press that two leaders of the Soviet Union are visiting India and Burma. While there, they urge the people to be aware of the "sinister nature of Western colonialism". We can compare, dispassionately and objectively, Western classical colonialism and the present-day Soviet imperialism as embodied in the form of the "People's Democracy". It is obvious — can any of the co-sponsors reassure us? — that in present-day Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria

or Outer Mongolia, no Congress Party would be possible.

In British India — I am not making an apolgy for British India — the Indian people did have a Congress Party which subsequently won independence for that country. Do any of the sponsors of the joint draft resolution imagine that a great spiritual man like Ghandi could live in freedom in any of these People's Democracies? Could he perform his work? That is only one of the possible comparisons between Western colonialism and present-day Soviet imperialism. Indeed, sometimes I marvel at the stupidity — and the Western Powers will forgive me for using that word — or the honesty exhibited when Queen Victoria proclaimed India as Her Majesty's Empire. If the British had been more Machiavellian, they would have proclaimed India a people's democracy.

In opposing the admission of these five satellites, I am not basing myself on the political, economic or social systems existing in these five countries. I know that the United Nations does not call for uniformity; I realize that, in this world Organization, we must learn to tolerate, and even welcome, variety. If the peoples of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Outer Mongolia had really chosen their present political, economic and social systems, I would be the last man to say anything against them. You know very well that those systems are imposed from outside. Therefore, when I oppose the admission of these five satellite States, I am opposing imperialism. I am taking a stand for the independence — real independence — of these five countries. That is is the gist of my stand.

People's Democracies are a fraud. The United Nations should expose that fraud and oppose it. If we, instead of exposing that fraud ,uphold it by giving our sanction to the admission of these countries, we would be promoting the ultimate purposes of the Soviet Union — domination of the world. If we should continue on that course, in not too many years to come, we will find more and

more so-called People's Democracies in the world.

Sir Percy Spender wishes to invite me to go on this hunting expedition. I will not join, because I know, and he knows, that this expedition is illegal and immoral, and because the profits he imagines will be gained at the end of this trip, I cannot foresee. I find a loss and not a profit.

If you have any doubts in regard to the legal side of this question, you should make this Committee accept the amendment submitted by the Cuban delegation relating to the joint draft resolution. What does this Cuban amendment call for? It calls for the reaffirmation of Article 4; it calls for loyalty to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. You propose a draft resolution and yet refuse to make that reference. You know that your legal grounds are weak. It is indeed a serious matter that the General Assembly should recommend to the Security Council a proposition which is contrary to the Charter and contrary to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice.

The speech made on the very first day of our debate by the representative of Canada was, of course, a very important speech. That speech placed this joint draft resolution before the Committee. I think that Sir Percy Spender of Australia dealt with Mr. Paul Martin very well and I do not need to repeat the legal aspects of Mr. Martin's speech. He devoted considerable time to a discussion of the phrase "peace-loving States". I thought he had a reason and a good cause for pleading with us to be tolerant and to give the benefit of the doubt — when there is a legitimate doubt — to the applicant States. So far as that liberality and tolerance are concerned, I agree with him. Nevertheless, I felt that he dealt with that clause of our Charter too lightheartedly. No matter how tolerant or objective we may be, I think we must see that Outer Mongolia does not pass the test. I do not ask you to examine the question of Outer Mongolia, by what I think to be the intentions of the Government of Outer Mongolia, or to be the character of Outer Mongolia.

I have presented these facts about this entity, Outer Mongolia. I told this Committee on Friday that in 1947 Mongolian forces invaded my country up to a depth of 100 kilometres, to a place called Peitaishan. I have reported to this Committee the participation of Outer Mongolia in the war in Korea against the United Nations. I have given you information with regard to Mongolian cavalry, Mongolian tank corps, and Mongolian pilots in the action in Korea. In my judgment, we must admit that Outer Mongolia, whatever it is, is not a peace-loving State. I do not think I am asking you to judge on a matter of intentions. I am asking you to make that test on the level of deeds and facts,

not on ideas or intentions.

I think that it is dangerous to treat that clause in our Charter — "peace-loving States" — too lightheartedly. After all, this Organization was set up, primarily, to maintain peace in the world. I think that this draft resolution undermines the moral prestige which it might have for the promotion of peacc. On this matter I am at once both more optimistic and more pessimistic than Mr. Paul Martin. I am more optimistic because I believe that, in fact, all peoples are peace-loving.

I was in Germany in the winter of 1934, less than a year after Hitler came to power. I stayed there for three months and talked with a great many Germans. Up to the winter of 1934, the German people were certainly peace-loving.

Not only were they peace-loving. The Germans at that time were deathly

afraid of another war.

Then what did Hitler do? Hitler washed the brains of the German people, reconditioned their minds, and converted peace-loving German people into

war-enthused German people.

That is the danger that the world faces. If we could promote freedom in this world, we would promote peace. When we promote the extension of and spreading of dictatorial regimes, we promote war. How did Hitler manage to control the minds of the German people? Of course he had the modern device

of propaganda — of organization — insidious control; but Hitler's rise to power and his application of absolute dictatorship in Germany was helped by the outside world. The appeasement and the concessions which the democratic countries made to Hitler served to tell the German people that the Fuehrer was not only infallible but also invincible.

I think we should have learned a lesson from that experience, from that period in history; and today, certainly, the United Nations should not enable the totalitarian regime that lives today to tell its subjects — its slaves — that the outside world regards that regime as infallible and invincible; and that all the outside world can do about it is to appease, and appease and appease.

That is, I think, a serious matter; and in passing this draft resolution if we should make it mean the admission of Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Outer Mongolia we would have done a serious disservice to the cause of peace. The people of these countries are struggling for freedom. That struggle for freedom is a part — if we but understand it — of our struggle for peace. Their struggle for freedom is mankind's surest guarantee for peace. The United Nations certainly should help these peoples, and not hamper them.

The package deal was passed by the Ad Hoc Political Committee on 7 December. The next day, the deal came up for approval by the General Assembly in a plenary session, at which Dr. Tsiang spoke as follows:

In opening this debate this morning, you, Mr. President, said that our intentions should be in the nature of explanation of vote, but at the same time you promised us that you would be liberal as regards both time and content. I can promise you that I will not abuse your liberality. I will not try to reopen this debate here, not because I think the subject is not important enough to justify a full debate, but because I think that the debate in the Ad Hoc Committee was quite lengthy and recent.

I have a personal reason for not trying to reopen this debate. I always find it distasteful to repeat myself, and very difficult to repeat what I have said before. With these preliminary remarks, I will proceed to explain my vote.

In the Ad Hoc Committee, I voted against this draft resolution, and today, in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, I shall again vote against it. This draft resolution requests the Security Council to consider the admission of eighteen States, but two questions must be answered. The first is: are all the uəətq@iə qpe qnd ot qq@ix qi si :si uoquənb puopəs əqi ¿pəyqpenb səteqs uəətq@iə States on one package?

As to the first question —are all eighteen States qualified? — the qualifications for membership are clearly stated in Article 4 of the Charter. Applicants for membership must first of all be States; that means independent sovereign States. The United Nations is an association of independent, sovereign States.

That is the first qualification.

Then the Charter stipulates that all applicants must be peace-loving. Since this institution was organized primarily to promote the peace of the world, that requirement is a minimum essential requirement. Then Article 4 goes on to require, in the third place, that all applicant States should be able and willing to fulfill the obligations of membership. That qualification is also obvious. I cannot conscientiously agree with any representative that the Charter provisions in this respect are too stringent or too narrow-minded. Indeed, the qualifications for membership are in minimum terms.

In my judgment, and in the judgment of the vast majority of representatives here, thirteen of these applicant States are certainly qualified to be Members. Indeed, how can anyone question the qualifications for mmbership of such States as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Austria, Japan, Ceylon, Jordan and

Libya, to mention only a number of these thirteen States?

All these thirteen applications, with the exception of Spain, have been examined, discussed and voted upon in the Security Council. In every case these States have received large majority votes in the Security Council. The failure of the Security Council to make favourable recommendations was caused by one reason, and one reason alone, the Soviet veto.

As to the application of Spain, I cannot imagine that any representative would say that Spain is not a peace-loving state. I cannot imagine that any representative would contend that Spain is not able or not willing to fulfill the obligations of membership. The claims of Spain for membership are obvious.

Therefore, so far as these thirteen States are concerned there is no difficulty and there ought to be no difficulty. Any attempt to bar these thirteen States

from membership on the part of any delegation would be a violation of the Charter and would be denying to these applicants their rights.

The draft resolution, however, includes five other applicants, the so-called "peoples' democracies", namely, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and

Outer Mongolia.

I do not think that the vast majority of the representatives here contend that these five so-called People's Democracies are independent sovereign States. I think that deep in your hearts and minds, you know that these five applicants are really just Soviet colonies, enslaved colonies at that. In the course of the debate, I did not in fact hear any representative trying to convince the world community that these so-called States are independent States.

As to Outer Mongolia, only six representatives tried to prove to us that Outer Mongolia is today an independent sovereign State. These six representatives were the representatives of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and India. Let us for argument sake — and just for argument sake — leave aside this point, this big question of whether they are really independent States. Let us leave that aside. We still have the other qualification, namely "peace-loving". Are these so-called People's Democracies peace-loving?

In answering that question, I do not ask the representatives to base their judgment on our guesses or estimations or the intentions of these regimes. I ask you to base your judgment on deeds. This body should know what the four European satellite States did in connection with the aggression against Greece. That is a matter of record here. It is not a matter of intention, design or imag-

ination. It is a fact, a deed, condemned by the United Nations.

As to Outer Mongolia, in 1947 Mongolian troops invaded my country to a depth of 100 kilometres up to a point called Peitaishan. When that aggression took place, I duly reported it to the Security Council. I did not fabricate that aggression for the sake of a debating point in the winter of 1955. Then Mongolian forces participated in the war in Korea against the United Nations.

There are today, as you all know, on the Island of Taiwan, 14,000 ex-prisoners of war who chose to go to Taiwan after the Armistice. Of these 14,000 prisoners of war, 5,000 have seen the Mongolian troops in action in North Korea, and in fact many of them fought side by side with Mongolian troops against the

United Nations.

In the Committee I offered to welcome a commission of investigation to question these ex-prisoners of war. I also said that, if the Committee wishes, we could send over as many of these men as you wish, to come here and answer your questions as to the nature and the extent of Mongolian participation in the war against the United Nations.

Therefore, I say, leaving the question aside as to whether Mongolia is independent or not, that these acts of aggression disqualify Outer Mongolia from

membership in the United Nations.

All these five applicants have been considered, examined and voted upon in the Security Council in past years. Not one of them ever received anything like a legal majority. The majority of the members of the Security Council, both permanent and non-permanent, have found these five applicant States to be disqualified from membership. That is the record. I see no new facts to change the nature of these five regimes.

The proposal before us puts the thirteen deserving and qualifying applicants in one package with the five undeserving and disqualified applicants. The device of a package is contrary to the opinion of the International Court of Justice. It cannot be otherwise, for admission must be on individual merit. We cannot

close our eyes and say: let us admit all. That is against the Charter as inter-

preted by the International Court of Justice.

In so far as the argument goes up to this point, the sponsors of the draft resolution did not disagree with me. One of the sponsors, the representative of Australia, said openly in the Committee that although he was one of the cosponsors, he considered the draft resolution to be contrary to the Charter, and he warned the Committee that by adopting the resolution, we all are "officiating at the burial of Article 4 of the Charter." He said openly that this package deal is contrary to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice.

On these points, I think basically even the sponsors of the draft resolution agree with my delegation. However, they go on to say that the present draft resolution is a compromise, a political solution for a hard problem. Some of them, more frank than others, will admit that the draft resolution is at the bot-

tom of their hearts a deal.

I do not put myself up as being so righteous as to rule out compromises and deals in politics. I have been in politics for some years and I know that politics sometimes makes extraordinary demands on our consciences. But I will say that while compromises are permissible to a certain extent, they are permissible only to the extent of the limits of the law. Within the terms of the Charter, let us arrange all sorts of compromises to solve our problem. But I do not think it is right for the General Assembly to arrange a compromise which is expressly against the Charter of the United Nations. I accept compromises within the limits of the Charter. I will not accept compromises which go beyond the limits of the Charter.

The five so-called people's democracies are, as I said, really colonies of the Soviet Union. The people's democracy is a device for the realization of Soviet imperialism. Should the United Nations lend its influence and its moral prestige to promote the designs of Soviet imperialism? Is that what the United Nations

was founded for?

In these five countries — Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Outer Mongolia — the peoples are struggling for freedom. I wish that we in the United Nations could send them some form of aid or a message of encouragement. For reasons of prudence, hitherto we have shut our eyes and closed our ears to the appeals of these peoples. Now the struggle for freedom on their part is an integral part of our global struggle for peace. I do not think that I need to argue for them that a genuine and lasting peace can only be founded on the freedom of the peoples.

In my mind, this draft resolution makes the chains of enslavement on these peoples heavier and stronger. My delegation cannot share in the responsibility for accepting these five so-called people's democracies into the United Nations. If it cannot help these peoples in their struggle for freedom, my delegation will

certainly refrain from adding to their difficulties.

IV

The package deal was passed by the General Assembly on 8 December. It was recommended by the General Assembly to the Security Council for prompt consideration. The latter met on 10 December, when Dr. Tsiang made the following statement.

Since I know that I do not have the gift of eloquence, I shall be very simple and brief in my intervention.

I wish, first of all, to thank my colleague from Peru for his very compli-

mentary reference to me personally.

Mr. President, your opening remarks were not as impartial as statements from the Chair should be. I would not be frank if I did not make that statement right away. I will not go into details at this point because I do not have your statement before me in its written text. I will simply say that my impres-

sion is that you deviated from objective impartiality.

Among the points you made I understand that you too, like all members of the Council, recognize that the Security Council is one of the principal organs of the United Nations, independent of the other organs, with its own functions and rights and its own rules of procedure. So long as the proceedings of the Security Council are in strict accordance with the provisions and principles of the Charter and with our rules of procedure, my delegation will co-operate loyally with you and the other members of the Council.

Another point that you made in your opening remarks, if I am not mistaken, is that members of the Security Council should pay due consideration to the sentiments of the General Assembly. I, having participated in all the recent debates, should know what those sentiments are. On this point too, I should like to say that I agree with you, although my delegation did not vote for this resolution, and I will do my utmost in its implementation. The only limitation to my efforts in this direction is the Charter. I will not, however, "officiate at the burial of Article 4", to use the phrase of Sir Percy Spender of Australia.

The representative of the United Kingdom referred to the thirteen draft resolutions which my delegation has had the honour of placing before this Council. I think that a few words of explanation may serve a good purpose at this point. In the first place, I attach no particular meaning to the number of draft resolutions that I have submitted. Members of the Council certainly will recall that in dealing with this matter, it has been customary for members of the Council to sponsor such applications as they find it, either from the point of view of sentiment or from the point of view of interest, right and advantageous. Naturally, my delegation anticipates that other members of the Council will sponsor other applications, and I am ready to give such other draft resolutions as will come up my sympathetic consideration. So to remove all misunderstanding, I had no intention whatever in submitting the thirteen draft resolutions that the Council at this time should limit itself to these thirteen particular draft resolutions.

In the second place, my delegation attaches no particular meaning to the order in which I submitted these draft resolutions. I have given each draft resolution an alphabetical notation, which is more or less for convenience in future reference. I think that the order in which I submitted those draft resolutions is not a bad order. I feel that such nations as Italy, Japan and Spain should come up at the top of the list, but I do not insist on that order in my draft resolutions. If the members of the Council should choose another order with re-

gard to these thirteen draft resolutions, I have a perfectly open mind.

There is another point on this matter which I should like to make clear. If the members of the Council would look over the records of the Council on this matter, it will be found that voting is always based on proposals for admission made by members of the Security Council. Voting in the Security Council is never based on applications for admission. I humbly submit that the records of the Security Council have established beyond any doubt that our guiding consideration in this matter is that the voting should be based on proposals for admission made by members and not on applications for admission made by applicant States.

As to what proposal should be voted upon first, we have rule 32 which states that proposals before the Council should be voted on in the order in which

they are submitted. That is our rule of procedure.

To sum up the attitude with which we approach this problem, I will say it in just one word. My delegation realizes that this is a serious problem. I will not go into the origins of this problem or into the responsibilities for facing the United Nations with such an awful deadlock as we face today. But we are here, we have this problem, we have this deadlock and we are trying to get out of it. In all our efforts to deal with the problem, you will find my delegation willing and ready to co-operate with other members of the Council to the utmost within the limits of the Charter.

On 10 December, Sir Leslie Munro, representing New Zealand, introduced a resolution for the Security Council to accept the package deal. The resolution was seconded by Ambassador de Freitas Valle of Brazil. New Zealand also claimed that the Brazil-New Zealand joint resolution should have priority over the resolutions which China had introduced on 7 December. The Chinese resolutions called for the admission of thirteen free states. On 11 December, Dr. Tsiang spoke on the Brazil-New Zealand proposal in the Security Council as follows:

The centre of discussion at this moment is the joint draft resolution placed before us by the delegations of Brazil and New Zealand. Two questions are involved. First, there is the question of priority. Secondly, there is the question of the merits of this draft resolution. Technically we can separate the two aspects. We might logically discuss the question of priority and then go on to discuss the question of merits. While it is logically and technically possible to separate the two aspects of this question, it seems to me that, after all, the two aspects are dependent one upon the other. Those who like the draft resolution would naturally concede priority; those who dislike the draft resolution would naturally be reluctant to concede priority.

In order to save the time of the Council, I will in one statement touch upon both aspects of this problem, namely, priority and merit. I would, first of all, put before the Council my evaluation of the text of this draft resolution.

Paragraph 1 of this draft resolution notes the resolution of the General Assembly adopted on 8 December 1955. I am convinced that this paragraph does not imply either approval or disapproval of the General Assembly's resolution; it simply registers a mere fact, and it is in the usual style of resolutions of the Security Council or other bodies of the United Nations. This paragraph is unimportant; while I cannot support it, I raise no objections to it.

I now come to the second paragraph. As interpreted by the sponsors, I understand that this paragraph provides a separate vote on each of the eighteen applicants. This is a distinct progress in the discussion of the subject. With this interpretation, this part of the resolution manages to keep within the letter of the law — that is, the letter of the Charter. I wish to thank the sponsors of the draft resolution for making this concession to the Charter of the United Nations.

This second paragraph lists the eighteen applicants. I note, first of all, that this list does not include Korea and Viet-Nam. I have submitted a series of resolutions which includes Korea and Viet-Nam, namely resolutions D and E. Does this paragraph mean that my draft on Korea and Viet-Nam will not be considered and voted upon, or does it mean that if the Council gives priority to this joint draft resolution those draft resolutions of mine would be voted on only after the present eighteen on the list are voted on? If this paragraph is interpreted to mean that my two draft resolutions on Korea and Viet-Nam are not to be voted upon at all, then I would not support this paragraph from that viewpoint. I should like to make it clear that I insist that the Council consider the applications of Korea and Vietnam and vote on those two draft resolutions. In the second place, this list has followed the order of application. It is the order that the Soviet delegation has always stood for. It begins with Albania, the so-called Mongolian People's Republic and ends with Spain.

So far as the order of this list is concerned, I am sure that it will also be the

order of voting when we come to the separate votes. In this respect, this draft resolution is again a total surrender to the contention of the Soviet Union. There is no compromise, there is no consideration of other viewpoints. The Soviet Union tells us that we must vote on these applicants in that order, and the draft resolution says: Let us vote on the applications in that order.

This list of course is the list of eighteen. The Soviet Union stand is: eighteen or none. According to the speeches here on Saturday, I understand that the sponsors and the supporters of this draft resolution answer: yes, all eighteen. Therefore, in the substance of this matter, the sponsors and the supporters again made a total surrender to the dictates of the Soviet Union. There is no compromise, there is no consideration of the viewpoint of the other delegations; that is the naked nature of this paragraph.

In procedure and in substance, this paragraph turns the United Nations into

a rubber stamp of the Soviet Union.

The final paragraph of this draft resolution is not clear. It appears to me to be a legalization and formalization of the package deal, which everybody has admitted is contrary to the Charter and to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. This would be especially so if the Security Council should accept the interpretation which the representative of the Soviet Union has just placed on that paragraph. According to his opinion, even the General Assembly would be bound to accept it as a package. The General Assembly would not be allowed to open the package to see what was in it.

In fact, if we were to follow the Charter and the rules of procedure, this final paragraph would not be necessary at all. The second paragraph should be changed into the main operative paragraph of the draft resolution. If the draft resolution could be changed in that way, it certainly would be much improved.

For these reasons, my delegation cannot support priority for this draft reso-

lution.

I wish now to present to the Security Council my views of the larger issues involved. In confining our attention to phrases and paragraphs of a resolution, we often lose sight of the forest because of the trees. I ask the Council now to look at this draft resolution from a distance and to see its real significance.

At our meeting on Saturday morning, the representative of the United Kingdom told us: "My Government has never thought of the United Nations as an association of like-mindedness States, such as an alliance or a coalition".

(S/PV.701, page 23)

My delegation's reaction to that statement is partial agreement and partial disagreement. My answer to that statement would be both yes and no. Of course the United Nations cannot enforce uniformity of political, social and economic systems. Of course we must learn to tolerate variety — variety both of systems and of policies. For example, I would readily concede that the United States would remain a Member of the United Nations in good standing whether the United States adopts flexible supports of farm prices or rigid supports of farm prices.

I would say the same thing for the United Kingdom — whether the United Kingdom nationalizes or denationalizes the coal mines. I would say the same thing for France — whether Mr. Faure or Mr. Mendes-France wins the next general elections. That is taken for granted. As far as that is concerned, it is not only the United Nations that cannot enforce uniformity, but even the separ-

ate States cannot enforce uniformity within their own limits.

However, from another point of view, the United Nations must have a minimum of like-mindedness in certain aspects which are basic to the United Nations. In that connection, any organization, if it is to be an organization at all,

must have a minimum of common aims and objectives. If an organization does not have a single common standard, either with regard to procedure or ob-

jectives, it would cease to be an organization.

As regards the United Nations, the Charter provides for a minimum of likemindedness. The Charter requires that we observe certain common standards and objectives. What are these? First of all, there is peace-loving — we must all agree to that. Naturally, in the interpretation of that common standard of peace-loving, we must be charitable or, to use the phrase of Sir Pierson Dixon, we must be benevolent. That is taken for granted.

Nevertheless, we cannot say that whether we are like-minded or not, whether we are peace-loving or not, it makes no difference in the United Nations. That is a proposition which I cannot concede. It is a matter of considerable import-

ance, and we do want to have like-mindedness in being peace-loving.

Secondly, the Charter provides for the sovereign equality of nations. What does that phrase mean? It means that there must not be any domination of one country over another; there must be no imperialism; all nations, large and small, must be accepted as sovereign equals. That is not such a fantastic likemindedness as some people might think. In fact, in many part of the world respect for sovereign equality of nations exists. Unfortunately, it is not universal. However, we have achieved that in important areas of the world.

Let us take, for example, Western Europe. From all that I know, France respects the sovereign equality of Luxembourg; and Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark have no fear of aggression from the United Kingdom and France. There is a community in which this Charter ideal is realized, and it can be used to serve as a model for that concept of the Charter, namely, the sovereign equal-

ity of nations.

We may turn to this hemisphere. In Central America there are ten republics, all small in size and population. They have for neighbours large States, ten times and even a hundred times their size. But again in this hemisphere it is commonly taken for granted that all States respect the sovereign equality of nations. I am even told that a small country like Costa Rica does not care to keep an army, which shows how much confidence the people of Costa Rica have in the concept of respect for the sovereign equality of nations. That is a fact and that fact is in conformity with the Charter.

When the framers of the Charter included that concept as one of the elements

of our common like-mindedness, they were not dreamers or Utopians.

Third, the Charter lays down another element of like-mindedness — that is, observance of, and respect for, human rights and fundamental freedoms. If the members of the Council should reread the Charter, I am sure they will all be surprised at the frequency with which that phrase is mentioned in the Charter: 'respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms'. That

phrase is repeated more often than any other in the whole Charter.

The Charter, of course, enjoins us not to intervene in the domestic affairs of States — and it may be said that this matter of human rights and freedoms is a matter of domestic concern. With the vast experience in international relations which we have, which the world has, we know that matter of observance of, and respect for, human rights has both aspects: a domestic aspect and an international aspect. And, if I am not wrong, the framers of the Charter put that concept into the Charter not out of general sentimental or humanitarian reasons alone, and still less for rhetorical purposes. I contend that that phrase was put into the Charter for a very practical purpose. We must remember that the San Francisco Conference was held at a time when the Second World War had not yet been finished, when all the participants in that Conference were

under the shadow of that awful horror of the Second World War. If there was one influence which dominated the thought of the framers of the Charter, it

was the spectre of the Second World War.

Now, when we look back upon the Second World War, we naturaly like to ask: How did it come about? How did it happen that, in this enlightened twentieth century, the world should have been afflicted with so awful a thing as that world war? Well, let us study the history. There is one feature about it that is unmistakable: Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, and Tojo in Japan could not possibly have carried their countries and their peoples into the war without first washing the brains of the peoples, controlling their thoughts, depriving them of these basic human rights and freedoms. That was the cause of war. I believe that all peoples are peace-loving. I believe that the peoples could make their will felt if they still had these fundamental human rights and freedoms. I believe that, in creating the conditions for peace in the world, nothing is so important as the observance of, and respect for, human rights.

From that point of view, and to that extent, this conception in the United Nations is a matter of international concern. And it must remain one of the basic elements of our like-mindedness. If we do not have like-mindedness in this respect, we may try to patch up one quarrel after another, but we will be

failing to create the conditions of an enduring peace.

We do not want uniformity, then. But we must have at least these three minimum elements of like-mindedness. If we do not have even these minimum basic elements of like-mindedness in the United Nations, this Organization of

ours will perish.

That was the situation in San Francisco in 1945. Have we progressed, have we developed, to a point where we can get along without these basic elements of like-mindedness? I think not. I think that in 1955 we must emphasize, cultivate and nourish these elements of like-mindedness more than ever. For what has happened since 1945? I think that the framers of the Charter in fact based their conceptions on the primacy of one world. In 1945, the one-world concept was not altogether a fact, but nevertheless it was part fact and part hope. The awful experience of the war and the common comradeship in arms led many people to believe that the one-world conception would grow. But, actually, since 1945 the one-world conception has lost ground. That is the basic difficulty in the United Nations: we are trying to impose a one-world organization on the fact of two worlds.

Let us take just one kind of development and see how this world has changed since 1945. I have mentioned the so-called common elements of like-mindedness; I have specified them and I have emphasized the concept of the sovereign equality of nations. Since the San Francisco Conference, we have had two lines of development. On the one hand, we have seen new nations born. We now have in Asia an independent Philippines, an independent India, an independent Pakistan, an independent Ceylon, an independent Burma, an independent Laos, an independent Cambodia, an independent Vietnam. That is a line of development in the direction of the Charter. These former colonies or protectorates today enjoy sovereign equality among the nations. That is a hopeful line of development; it is worthy of the United Nations and of those Member States that made it possible. On the other hand, we have another line of development in the world: we see Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Outer Mongolia losing whatever sovereign independence they had. That is going in a direction against the Charter.

Here then, we are faced with two lines of development: one in the direction of the Charter, for the promotion of the sovereign equality of nations — the

other in a direction against the Charter, suppressing such independence as existed, creating empire over the peoples. That is the dilemma. That is the

central issue facing this world.

In the course of this Assembly, during the time we have met here, we have all been bothered about conflict regarding the Gaza Strip, conflict in Cyprus, conflict in North Africa. We have had to pay some attention to the question of West Iran and to the question of South West Africa. All these questions and conflicts sink into insignificance when compared with the central conflict between one line of development, the Charter line, for the realization of the sovereign equality of nations, and the other line of development, for the suppression of the freedom and independence of peoples and the building of empires.

This, therefore, is the issue: Shall the frontier of freedom be maintained and perhaps extended, so that the day will come when the whole world will really exist on the basis of the Charter, when every nation will feel certain and confident that its sovereignty will be respected by others? Or shall the world hereafter be entirely engulfed within the Iron Curtain? That is the central issue before the world today. All other issues and questions sink into insignificance

when we face that issue.

So far as that supreme issue of the age is concerned, we are all involved — no matter what political systems we have and no matter where we are situated. I would go even further and say that, in the face of this supreme issue, we must all take a stand. The interests of all of us are at stake — the interests of the

free Member States and those of the free applicant States.

How does this question of the admission of new Members affect the supreme issue of this age? The slogan is: "All Eighteen", or "Eighteen or None". Now, this eighteen includes five satelite States. The four European satellite States are remote from my country. I admit that my Government's knowledge of those States may not be as ample as that of other delegations here. In the Ad Hoc Political Committee, we heard a presentation of the situation in those four satellite States of Europe by the representative of Cuba. He told us about conditions in the Danubian Valley. He pictured for us the system of slave labour and the persecution of religion. Since I do not know that part of the world so well as some other representatives, I did not myself set forth any arguments on those points. But several facts are clear. These Danubian satellite States were condemned only yesterday by the United Nations for their aggression against Greece. That is common knowledge. No matter how remote my country may be from the Danubian Valley, we know that fact. And that fact seems to me to be very important for the consideration of the United Nations

Then, there is another fact — a fact which we know without having to have an intimate knowledge of these countries. Whether we like or do not like the political, social and economic systems in those countries, we know for certain that the systems are imposed from outside. I cannot imagine that the people of Hungary would of themselves choose to persecute the Catholic Church or to condemn a Prince of the Church to a death sentence. Could any representative here conscientiously say that the systems prevailing in those countries are not imposed from outside? Can any representative really believe that these four European satellite States are not today mere colonies of the Soviet Union — and slave colonies at that? Other representatives claim that they know more about these States than I do. I am bound to defer, to a certain extent, to their opinion. But I cannot believe that they could really support the admission of those States to the United Nations.

Then, there is Outer Mongolia. During the long debates in the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly, only six delegations testified to the

qualifications of Outer Mongolia and tried to prove that Outer Mongolia was qualified for membership of the United Nations. Those delegations were the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India. I submit that the testimony of those six delegations on this question is biased, is prejudiced, is not objective, is not impartial. My country is closer to Outer Mongolia. I think that what I present to the Security Council on this subject deserves some consideration by the members of the Council. I shall not go back into history. I shall not touch upon complicated issues. I shall present to this Council only

one consideration: Is Outer Mongolia peace-loving? In 1947, Mongolian troops invaded my country to a depth of 100 kilometres, to a point called the Peitaishan. At the time when that aggression took place, I duly reported it to this Council. We all know, too, that Outer Mongolia participated with the Chinese Communists and the Korean Communists in the war in Korea against the United Nations. Mongolian cavalry, Mongolian tank corps, Mongolian pilots fought against the United Nations in Korea. There are in Formosa five thousand ex-prisoners of war who saw the Mongolians in action, who saw the Mongolians fighting side by side with Northern Koreans and Chinese Communists against the United Nations. I offer to welcome a commission of the Security Council in my country for the purpose of questioning these five thousand witnesses. I offer, as an alternative, to bring here as many witnesses as members may desire to question and examine. The fact that Outer Mongolia has committed aggression against the United Nations is indisputable.

The United Kingdom representative states that his Government is not certain about Outer Mongolia's claim but feels obliged to defer to the opinion of India, in particular. My Government is, I think, in a slightly better position to know Outer Mongolia than is the Indian Government. I therefore find it as difficult as the United Kingdom representative finds it easy to defer to India's opinion.

Finally, in this debate in the Security Council, we have been reminded again and again that public opinion is overwhelmingly in support of this package deal, and that that is confirmed by the fifty-two votes in favour of the proposition. I know very well that there were fifty-two votes cast in favour of the proposition. If, when people say "public opinion", they mean the opinion of the delegations at the Headquarters of the United Nations, I think that they are right. But, if they mean the opinion of the peoples of the world, I do not think that they are right.

It remains to be seen how the common people the world over would look upon this package deal. I myself believe that the peoples all over the world expect the United Nations to stand by its principles. When we sacrifice our principles the peoples of the world will say we sacrifice the existence of the United Nations - that is, we commit moral suicide. As it is, the Security Council has been incapacitated by the Soviet veto. We turned to the Assembly to use its moral influence. When you base a proposition on a deal — and I will say an illegal and immoral deal - I am afraid you are destroying that very moral prestige of the Assembly which we hoped the United Nations could use for the good of all peoples of the world.

I appeal to all delegations to join with my delegation to make a last fight for the preservation of the United Nations. I appeal to all delegations to muster enough courage to stand up to the Soviet Union and say, "We will not be dic-

tated to".

I formally move an amendment to the joint draft resolution submitted by Brazil and New Zealand. I would add the names of Korea and Vietnam to the list of applications for membership contained in the second paragraph of the draft resolution.

At the afternoon session of the Security Council on 13 December, the package deal came to a vote. The Soviet Union vetoed the applications of all fifteen free states while China vetoed the application of Outer Mongolia. Sobolev, the Soviet representative, tried to direct the anger of the disappointed applicants towards China, using for that purpose, gutter language. Dr. Tsiang replied as follows:

I could easily reply to the representative of the Soviet Union in tones and words such as he used in regard to me. I will refrain from doing that. It is not up to our Chinese conception of dignity, decorum and politeness. If I should reply to him in similar vein, my fellow countrymen might wonder how it happened that I, after eight years of service in the United Nations, should suddenly

turn to being a barbarian.

The responsibility for our failure is clear. It is on the record of the United Nations and on the record of the Security Council. The Soviet representative professes that he and his Government wish to have this problem solved. But the way he goes about solving the problem is to cast fifteen vetoes against fifteen free, independent and worthy nations. The real trouble is this dictatorial stand of eighteen or none. I think that all Members of the United Nations must realize that that stand of eighteen or none is contrary to Article 4 of the Charter as interpreted by the International Court of Justice.

A Member of the United Nations, an important Member at that, persistently violates the Charter. That is our problem. How are we going to deal with that Member, how are we going to call it to account for the violation of the Charter? Once we solve that problem, I am sure that the problem of admission of new

members will be solved quickly and smoothly.

VII

On 14 December, at the 705th meeting of the Security Council, Ambassador Cabot Lodge, representing the United States of America, moved that Japan be admitted to the United Nations at the 11th session of the General Assembly. Sobolev countered on 15 December with a motion to admit Outer Mongolia and Japan in another package. Dr. Tsiang spoke as follows:

I think that it is unnecessary for me to take the time of the Council to argue on the well-known qualifications of Japan for membership of the United Nations. That Japan is qualified — fully qualified — for membership of the United Nations is universally admitted. From 1 December, when the debate on the admission of new Members began in the Ad Hoc Political Committee, to this very moment I have not heard one single representative telling the United Nations that Japan was not qualified. Even the Soviet Union delegation never for one moment objected to the qualifications of Japan.

Let us go back to the record a little bit earlier. When the application of Japan first came before this Council in June 1952, even at that early moment the Soviet Union delegation did not say that Japan was not qualified for membership; the Soviet Union did not say that Japan was not peace loving, that Japan was not able or willing to fulfill the obligations of membership. Then the Soviet Union delegation argued on one ground, and one ground alone, that Japan had

not concluded a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.

So far as my delegation is concerned, we have never had a single second of doubt that Japan is fully qualified for membership in the United Nations. So far as that is concerned, Japan is and will always remain a great nation and an

honoured nation among the community of nations.

As for the qualifications of Outer Mongolia, I need not say much about this. I have said all I wish to say on this subject. I would just say that Outer Mongolia is not an independent, sovereign nation. It is a Soviet colony, and as a colony it has been used by the Soviet Union for aggression against my country in 1947 and for aggression against Korea and the United Nations in the war in Korea. Although Members of the Assembly during this period have been very tolerent in interpreting and applying Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations — the Article that spells out the qualifications for membership — only six delegations have tried to prove that Outer Mongolia has those qualifications. All that, I think, is clear.

Now we have before us the same old proposition that we should bracket two applicants together. To condition the admission of Japan on the admission of any other country is a violation of the Charter. That is a serious act. I think the Security Council should make a serious attempt to prevent such a flagrant

violation of the Charter.

Furthermore, to bracket Japan and Outer Mongolia together, that is to say, to equate Japan with Outer Mongolia, is an insult to Japan and an insult to the intelligence of the world. Such a proposition is certainly not acceptable.

VIII

The Security Council's recommendation to admit sixteen states was accepted by the General Assembly in the evening of 14 December. Dr. Tsiang expressed his reflections on the whole episode in the following speech before the 556th plenary session of the Assembly on 15 December.

I participate in these proceedings with mixed feelings. First of all, I am happy that twelve free nations have been admitted. During the years of the long deadlock the delegation of China, together with many other delegations, has worked hard for their admission. Now, at long last, they are with us. They are happy, and we are all happy.

Secondly, I am very unhappy over the fact that Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Vietnam have been prevented by the Soviet veto from becoming Members of the United Nations. Were it not for that abusive veto these

three free nations would also join us.

Thirdly, while I am glad that Outer Mongolia has been excluded, I feel very sad over the fact that four captive nations — Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania — have been included. By including them the United Nations has accepted their captivity, de facto and de jure. What is more, the United Nations has, in appearance at least, set the seal of approval on their captivity. I know that many representatives have made specific reservations and qualifications with regard to these four captive nations, but the iron curtain will shut out these qualifications and reservations from the ears of the Albanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian and Romanian peoples. These peoples will never understand the real motives of United Nations action. I am afraid that they will never forgive us for deserting them and deserting, at the same time, our own principles. This part is to me the evil part of the package deal. For abstaining on these four captive nations in the Security Council I confess I feel ashamed. My action has made the chains of these peoples harder to bear, at least for the time being.

The debate on the admission of new Members started on 1 December in the Ad Hoc Political Committee and ended here last night with the vote on Spain. During these days of intense effort many representatives have been good enough to come to tell me that, whether they agreed or disagreed with my stand, they understood me and, to a certain extent, appreciated the fight that I was making for the freedom of these captive peoples. I wish to thank them for their courtesy

and their sympathetic understanding.

In the United Nations sometimes mutual understanding is, I think, even

more important than mutual agreement.

I refer to these private assurances for another reason — an even more important reason. I see in them a real hope. Under different circumstances, I believe, many of the free nations of the world will yet give to these captive peoples their support in their struggle for freedom. I hold this belief because the hard facts of life will yet teach the world that an enduring peace cannot be based on appearament or compromise with principles. Enduring peace can be established only on the solid foundation of the freedom of peoples.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

Revised drast resolution submitted by Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, New Zealand, Norway. Pakistan. Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Yemen and Yugoslavia on 2 December 1955 before the Ad Hoc Political Committee providing that the General Assembly requests the Security Council to consider the admission of all those eighteen countries about which no problem of unification arises.

The General Assembly,

Having noted the general sentiment which has been expressed on numerous occasions in favour of the widest possible membership of the United Nations,

Having received the preliminary report (A/2973) of the Committee of Good Offices established by the General Assembly resolution 718 (VIII) of 23 Octo-

ber 1953,

Taking into account the statements about the admission of new members made by permanent members of the Security Council in the general debate of the present session of the General Assembly,

Believing that a broader representation in the membership of the United Nations will enable the organization to play a more effective role in the current international situation,

- 1. Expresses appreciation of the work and efforts of the Committee of Good offices:
- 2. Requests the Security Council to consider, in the light of the general opinion in favour of the widest possible membership of the United Nations, the pending applications for membership of all those eighteen countries about which no problem of unification arises;
- 3. Requests further that the Security Council make its reports on these applications to the General Assembly during the present session.

Note: The above draft resolution was adopted by the Ad Hoc Political Committee at its 32nd meeting on 7 December 1955 and later approved by the General Assembly at its 552nd meeting on 8 December 1955.

APPENDIX II

Joint draft resolution submitted by Brazil and New Zealand on 10 December 1955 at the 701st meeting of the Security Council recommending the admission of Albania, Outer Mongolia, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Japan, Laos and Spain.

The Security Council,

Noting resolution A/RES/357 adopted by the General Assembly on 8 December 1955 in which the Security Council was requested "to consider in the light of the general opinion in favour of the widest possible membership of the United Nations the pending applications for membership of all those eighteen countries about which no problem of unification arises",

Having considered separately the applications for membership of Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Ja-

pan, Laos and Spain,

Recommends to the General Assembly the admission of the above-named countries.

Note: Since all the substantive parts of the above draft resolution were rejected by the Security Council at its 704th meeting, the draft resolution as a whole was not put to a vote.

APPENDIX III

Amendment submitted by China on 13 December 1955 at the 702nd meeting of the Security Council to the joint draft resolution of New Zealand and Brazil.

Add "Republic of Korea" and "Republic of Vietnam" in the second paragraph.

Note: The amendment was put to a vote in two parts at the 704th meeting of the Security Council on 13 December 1955. It was not carried owing to the Soviet Union's vetoes on both the "Republic of Korea" and the "Republic of Vietnam".

APPENDIX IV

Draft resolution submitted by the United States of America on 14 December 1955 at the 705th meeting of the Security Council.

The Security Council,

Recommends to the General Assembly that it admit Japan to the United Nations at its eleventh regular session.

Note: The above draft resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union on 15 December 1955 at the 706th meeting of the Security Council, although it obtained 10 affirmative votes from other members of the Council.

Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 705th meeting on 14 December 1955 recommending the admission of 16 states.

The Security Council,

Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution A/RES/357 of 8 December

1955 on the admission of new Members to the United Nations,

Having considered separately the applications for membership of Albania, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria. Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Laos and Spain,

Recommends to the general Assembly the admission of the above-named coun-

tries to the United Nations.

Note: In the voting of the above resolution, China abstained on the four Soviet satellites (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania) and voted in favour of the rest 12 free states.

APPENDIX VI

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 555th plenary meeting on 14 December 1955 approving the recommendation made by the Security Council to admit the 16 states

The General Assembly,

Having received the recommendation (A/3099) of the Security Council of 14 December 1955 that the following countries should be admitted to membership in the United Nations: Albania, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Laos and Spain,

Having considered the application for membership of each of these countries, Decide to admit the above-mentioned sixteen countries to membership in the

United Nations.

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Note: When the recommendations for the admission of the sixteen states were put to a vote separately, China abstained on the four Soviet satellites (Albania, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria) and voted in favour of the rest 12 free states.

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